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The institution of nuclear power in Japan appears to be drifting; nevertheless it 
persists. For the past 60 years, conservative politicians, technologists, and electric 
companies have acted in concert, for different reasons, to achieve a full nuclear fuel 
cycle: specifically technology for reprocessing and enriching uranium. Their pursuit 
has eroded the bottom-line spirit of peaceful use; to be sure, it has been excessively 
ambitious for Japan’s status as a non-nuclear-weapon state. The mastering of the 
full nuclear fuel cycle has resulted in a competency trap, excluding or delaying 
development of alternatives to nuclear power. Furthermore, this situation has 
heightened nuclear power’s sunk costs. The critical conjuncture of the March 11, 
2011 incident has had a limited impact only. Anti-nuclear activists, the weakest 
concerned actor, try to dramatize their movement for “exit from nuclear,” but they 
have failed to bring about electoral changes.
Keywords nuclear power, institution, actors, spirit of peaceful use, full nuclear fuel  
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Introduction
The incident at Fukushima on March 11, 2011 (hereafter the March 11 incident) 
was a critical juncture for Japan’s nuclear power policy and its related industries. 
Not only did the incident produce enormous impact on the health and 
human security of nearby residents, but it also raised questions about nuclear 
safety, energy policy, and environmental degradation. Indeed, the March 
11 incident immediately brought about widespread public fear, particularly 
because the government and the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) 
concealed information related to both the incident and the resulting radioactive 
contamination of the air, ocean, and soil, for at least three months. Later, as all 
nuclear reactors were temporarily shut down, in May 2012, for safety checks, 
anti-nuclear power rallies mushroomed to demand a permanent elimination of 
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the government’s nuclear energy program. The rallies were followed by a tug of 
war between Tokyo and the three prefectures in the Kansai area over whether 
or not operation of the Oi nuclear plant in Fukui Prefecture should be resumed. 
However, the March 11 incident and the subsequent anti-nuclear power rallies 
had only a limited impact. The central government resumed operation of the Oi 
power plant in June. Furthermore, in the general election held in December 2012, 
the politicians advocating “exit from nuclear” failed to obtain voters’ support. The 
election result was a landslide victory of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), 
ending up with the inauguration of a cabinet led by Abe Shinzo, pro-nuclear LDP 
leader. The ongoing policy debate focuses on safety, not the question of whether 
or not to keep nuclear power. 
Why did this unprecedented shock, a real critical juncture, fail to bring about 
a change in the government’s policy on nuclear power? In other words, why does 
nuclear power remain alive in Japan in spite of the disaster and the mounting 
criticism? In addressing these questions, this article examines what aims the 
main actors relevant to nuclear power have pursued while coping with important 
international and domestic junctures, and how the spirit of peaceful use has been 
eroded. In fact, the most dominant actors, even if with different motivations, 
have come together to support the persistence of the institution of nuclear power. 
Despite the March 11 incident’s depressing impact, they still remain supportive of 
the reliance on nuclear power. Anti-nuclear activists have led rallies to challenge 
the value of energy independence based, inter alia, on nuclear power. However, 
conservative politicians, encroaching upon the spirit of the so-called peaceful use 
of nuclear power, remain aligned with nine electric companies and officials from 
the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI), formerly the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI). The institution of nuclear power is not 
exhausted yet. It seems to be drifting, but it persists.
Nuclear Power as an Institution 
Emerging studies on the March 11 incident either analyze different reasons 
behind the nuclear disaster, criticize the government’s response to the incident, 
or propose alternative energy policies. It is possible to group these studies as 
follows. First, some studies focus on the relations between the central government 
and the local governments hosting the nuclear plants (Dusinberre and Aldrich 
2011; Kaneko 2012; Onitsuka 2012). Second, other studies reveal the triangular 
relations between the government, politicians, and electric companies (Nanao 
2011; Yoshioka 2011). Despite the differences of explanations concerning the 
roles of the different groups, they commonly point out reciprocal relations 
between the three actors. Third, a few studies highlight technological nationalism 
(Penny 2012). Indeed technological nationalism and national grandeur appear in 
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Japanese literature such as that of Toyoda Arisune (2012) praising Japan’s nuclear 
technology. Finally, reexamining the underestimated role of the United States, 
some recent studies uncover U.S. pressure on Japan to adopt nuclear power in the 
1950s (Arima 2008; Zwigenberg 2012). 
The above-mentioned studies are worthy to note, but they offer reductionist 
explanations. Each study highlights a single factor to account for the enduring 
complex phenomenon of support for nuclear power. To understand the reasons 
why Japan’s nuclear power policy has been maintained, particularly after such a 
critical juncture, one needs to scrutinize the ways in which diverse stakeholders 
act for or against, it. One also needs to examine the consequences of their actions 
in the long run, particularly the gradual erosion of either the values or the spirit 
embedded in the adoption of nuclear power.
To be sure, nuclear power is an institution. As opposed to technological 
determinism, I argue that the development of technology is not a mere 
consequence of inner logic. Its trajectory is shaped by people and by society. In 
this respect, there is no pure technology (Bijker and Law 1992, 3; Adria 2010). 
Nuclear technology, especially, is socially shaped.
In considering nuclear power as an institution, I examine both internal 
dynamics and the relationship between the institution and the outside world. 
Early institutionalist theories failed to notice this point. As Fioretos (2011) and 
Thelen (2004) aptly point out, early theories emphasized the lock-in effect: the 
institution’s initial control over the trajectory that followed. The early studies 
presumed that there is automaticity in the logic of institutional persistence; they 
believed that an institution is punctuated only by an external shock. In other 
words, those studies concentrated on the internal inertia of persistence and the 
external determinant of the institution’s trajectory; they overlooked internal 
dynamics that could channel the mode of change at the particular time of an 
external shock. In contrast, recent works tackle this problem—how institutional 
persistence can coexist with gradual changes within the institution (Pierson 2000; 
Ikenberry 2001; Pierson 2004; Thelen 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2010). For 
example, the work of Mahoney and Thelen (2010) sheds light on the relationship 
between internal dynamics, institutional change, and external shocks. According 
to them, external shocks cannot bring about the institution’s breakdown or 
displacement unless internal dynamics have exhausted the values and spirit 
embedded in the institution. At that particular time, the institution’s breakdown 
depends on the extent to which the mode of relationship between individual 
actors (or groups) within the institution has encroached upon its values and 
spirit. I argue that if the institution is not ready to be changed, an external shock 
has little impact on it. This logic of institutional persistence and change can be 
applied to nuclear power in Japan. Here I need to elaborate some related notions, 
as follows.
Value and Spirit: At the initial stage of Japan’s development of nuclear power, 
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that is, in the early 1950s, the relevant actors’ bottom-line value was energy 
security. Also, they referred to the term “peaceful use” of nuclear technology 
as the spirit. The bottom-line value represents something worthy of pursuit to 
actors who are promoting or associated with nuclear power. The spirit refers to 
an initial force legitimizing and controlling the actors’ pursuit of the values. It is 
worth noting that the value and the spirit may evolve over time. In the case of 
Japan, the value of energy security has been upheld without any change, whereas 
the spirit of peaceful use has been eroded gradually but seriously. The spirit has 
been affected by inherent characteristics of nuclear technology. Namely, nuclear 
technology can serve two purposes: weapons development and energy use. These 
characteristics have fostered ambiguity whereby diverse actors have competed, 
or coalesced, or supported one another for different reasons. In fact, actors have 
upheld different expectations in regards to nuclear power thus affecting the spirit 
of peaceful use.
Actors: There are four main actors—conservative politicians, technologists, 
electric companies, and anti-nuclear activists. First, conservative politicians are 
important figures either in the cabinet or in the legislature. Despite power shifts 
from the LDP to the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in 2009 and from DPJ 
to LDP in 2012, the mainstream political trend in Japan has remained intact. 
Personal motivations of the politicians to support nuclear power have differed: 
Some of them have supported it in order to accumulate all potential technological 
capabilities; others have done so for the sake of technological independence; 
and still others may have supported it for both reasons. For all of them, however, 
energy security has been the bottom-line value. Second, technologists are 
officials and experts from MITI, later METI, and from the Japan Science and 
Technology Agency (JSTA). They have been deeply involved in the decision-
making related to nuclear power. These government organizations and officials 
have not only sanctioned electric companies’ business ventures, but they have 
also acted as “guarantors” of the national nuclear energy project (Dauvergne 
1993). Conservative politicians and the technologists have promoted nuclear 
power as kokusaku, meaning state-sponsored policy. Third, electric companies 
are supported by kokusaku; the government has protected electric companies’ 
business interests. The government has provided them with a public relations 
campaign so that the companies have been able to find new sites to build nuclear 
plants. For instance, the public relations campaign funding reached an average of 
10 billion Japanese yen annually at the end of the 1980s. In return, the companies 
have kept kokusaku alive by sustaining local economies, particularly by paying 
taxes as well as official and unofficial subsidies (Yoshida 2000, 62-3). Finally, anti-
nuclear activists are not a unified group. Most of the activists have focused on 
the abolition of nuclear weapons, and thus they have mostly remained mute on 
the peaceful use of nuclear technology. Only a small segment of the anti-nuclear 
activists has advocated anti-nuclear power, and their weak standing has long 
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been abraded by the government’s coercive tactics (Aldrich 2008). Only after the 
March 11 incident did a strong group advocating “exit from nuclear” emerge. 
Roles: In terms of the roles played by the actors, there are promoters, 
symbionts, insurgents, and innovators. First, promoters are those who actively 
push the program. They support not only the value of energy security but also 
the spirit of peaceful use, at least at face value. The electric companies have been 
the most important promoters because they have benefited directly from the 
institution. They have been willing to pay some costs in order to collect better 
returns in the end. Conservative politicians have also been crucial promoters 
from the beginning. They have been basically pro-American and anti-communist; 
they have aligned themselves with the U.S. policy of nuclear-technology transfer 
to Japan. Second, symbionts are those who take part in the institution, but their 
commitment lies in their enthusiasm for the byproducts of the institutional 
existence and burgeoning. More important, their interests are not always 
compatible with the spirit of peaceful use. In Japan, conservative politicians have 
been promoters in most instances; at the same time, some of the top rightwing 
politicians have been symbionts. They have taken advantage of a booming 
nuclear energy industry, on the one hand, and have pursued a full nuclear fuel 
cycle that may breach the taboo of nuclear armament, on the other (Suzuki 2006). 
Third, insurgents are those who seriously “reject the institutional status quo” and 
earnestly seek to replace the institution (Mahoney and Thelen 2010, 23-4). But 
they can never achieve their objective by themselves; other actors must make 
concerted efforts for the same objective. In Japan, the insurgents are represented 
by the activists. Finally, innovators are those who try to correct the existing 
practices and restore the early value and spirit. Notably, their efforts can hardly 
be successful because of the already well-established practices. Innovators differ 
from insurgents in the sense that the former adhere to and act for the persistence 
of the institution. In Japan a small group of officials in the government were the 
innovators who made attempts to liberalize the electric industry between the end 
of the 1990s and the first half of the 2000s.
Junctures: Several important events occurred in Japan and around the 
world even before the March 11 incident in Fukushima. These events may be 
called “important junctures,” in comparison to the critical juncture, the March 
11 incident. That incident has changed dramatically the public perception of 
nuclear power; its impact on internal dynamics has been critical. It is, however, 
noteworthy that there were important junctures prior to the March 11 incident. 
Each important juncture has had its own unique impact on the institution. The 
important junctures are the pressure by the United States in the early 1950s, the 
oil crisis in 1973, the Chernobyl incident in 1986, and the accidents in Japan in 
the mid-1990s. With the exception of the accidents in the mid-1990s and the 
March 11 incident, these important junctures mostly contributed to reinforcing 
the existing institution of nuclear power.
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Internal Dynamics: At each important juncture, every actor’s response has 
changed slightly (see Table 1). Inasmuch as preferences and capacities differ 
among the actors, the ways in which they cope with the junctures differ from one 
another. Sometimes they passively react, and sometimes they actively manipulate 
domestic or international events to achieve their own objectives. For instance, at 
the initial stage, conservative politicians used the American call for “Atoms for 
Peace” to implement the idea of the nuclear energy project either for personal 
political purposes or because of their commitment to national grandeur. In the 
stagnating years, some of the politicians encroached upon the spirit of peaceful 
use. Calling public attention to nuclear weapons development by North Korea, 
they openly challenged the spirit. Technologists in the government made nuclear 
power a state-sponsored industry; they supported and supervised the electric 
companies; they were committed to achieving independent nuclear power and 
the full fuel cycle. In response to a series of accidents in the mid-1990s, they 
became the innovators who cared about institutional persistence. The electric 
companies and manufacturers, related to this business, continued to promote 
nuclear power. But their role changed over time: commercialization in the 
formative years, contributing to technological independence in the burgeoning 
years, and active campaigners in the stagnating years. The anti-nuclear activists 
mostly accepted the value of nuclear power, focusing on the weaponry side of that 
technology. But they opposed the technology itself in various ways when three 
events took place: the exposure of the fishing boat Lucky Dragon No. 5 to a U.S. 
nuclear test in 1954, the Chernobyl incident in 1986, and the March 11 incident 
in 2011. In sum, within a certain range each actor’s role and composition have 
gradually changed over time; particularly, the ways in which dominant actors 
contribute to institutional persistence have gradually shifted. 




































Note: Actor in parentheses retains weak standing.
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Institutional Emergence, 1953-1972
In this formative stage, the prime promoter was U.S. President Eisenhower who 
gave legitimacy to the so-called peaceful use of nuclear power. With his “Atoms 
for Peace” speech at the UN General Assembly in December 1953, the U.S. 
government urged Japan to adopt the nuclear energy project. As critics argue, 
Eisenhower delivered the speech as part of the U.S. containment strategy toward 
the Soviet Union (Tanaka and Kuznick 2011). In fact, both camps in the East 
and the West made efforts to proliferate or transfer nuclear technology to their 
own allies. The Soviet Union delivered it to China, Eastern European allies and 
North Korea. Meanwhile, the United States and the United Kingdom gave the 
technology to their allies, including Japan and South Korea. 
Without political partners in the hosting countries, the American technology 
transfer might have failed. In Japan, the United States partnered with Nakasone 
Yasuhiro and Shoriki Matsutaro. Nakasone, who later became prime minister 
in 1982, succeeded for the first time in securing a budget in the Diet, in March 
1954, for the purpose of atomic research. As an anti-communist and an advocate 
of remilitarization, Nakasone called for a nuclear power project in 1959, during 
his tenure as the director of the Japan Science and Technology Agency. With his 
support, Japan succeeded in producing over 90% enriched uranium in a research 
laboratory in 1962 (Yamaoka 2011). Just as the converging of interests toward 
national grandeur between nuclear engineers and policy makers led to the 
establishment of a techno-political regime in France (Hecht 2009), so Nakasone’s 
drive for technological nationalism, combined with the efforts of nuclear 
engineers, brought about acquisition of independent nuclear technology in Japan. 
Furthermore, a recent study based on declassified documents reveals that 
the U.S. government approached Shoriki, the president of Yomiuri Shimbun 
and Nihon Terebi, in order to propagate the peaceful use of nuclear power. The 
United States provided Shoriki with a 10 million dollar loan for Nihon Terebi; 
in response, Shoriki used the media as an instrument to propagate the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy. The United States approached him for several reasons. He 
was a staunch anti-communist, just as Nakasone was. Also, unlike the public 
broadcasting company NHK, Yomiuri Shimbun and Nihon Terebi did not have a 
strong progressive labor union (Arima 2008). 
The collaboration between the U.S. government and Shoriki, above all, 
aimed at watering down the Japanese people’s anti-nuclear sentiment that had 
sprung up after the Lucky Dragon incident of March 1954, when a Japanese 
fishing boat was exposed to the U.S. hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll in the 
Marshall Islands. Angered by the death of a crew member, 32 million Japanese 
signed up to join the anti-nuclear movement. This resulted in the formation of 
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the Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo) in 1955, 
which in turn facilitated the establishment of the Citizens’ Nuclear Information 
Center (Genshiryoku Shiryo Jyohositsu) two decades later (Wittner 1997, 153-56; 
Dusinberre and Aldrich 2011, 687). 
Nevertheless, the United States launched an extensive campaign to promote 
the use of civilian nuclear industry in foreign countries. In this context, the 
president of General Dynamics, John Hopkins, visited Japan in December 
1954. Hopkins was the person who once called the transfer of nuclear power to 
allies the “Atomic Marshall Plan” (Zwigenberg 2012). In Japan, Shoriki played 
an active role in rallying support for nuclear power, particularly at the Atoms 
for Peace exhibition in 1955. Using his media as instruments of propaganda, 
Shoriki depicted nuclear power energy as an “industrial revolution through 
atoms.” As a result, the total number of visitors to the exhibition reached 350,000 
in November and December 1955. The most important impact must have been 
the “psychological effect” of such a large number (Arima 2008, 120). In May 
1956, a more striking event took place: An Atoms for Peace exhibition was 
held in Hiroshima, one of the two cities devastated by the atomic bombings. 
One hundred thousand people visited the exhibition and accepted the idea that 
nuclear energy could be used for civilian purposes.
The collaboration between the U.S. government and the conservative 
Japanese politicians was a success. The strong anti-nuclear sentiment, exposed by 
the Lucky Dragon incident, dissipated significantly. Anti-nuclear activists, and 
citizens more broadly, became silent over the question of nuclear power.
Consequently, postwar Japan entered an era of nuclear power. The 
government created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in the prime 
minister’s office in 1956; the AEC became the highest legal decision-making 
body with regard to nuclear policy. The legislature passed the Basic Law on 
Atomic Power in December 1955, which entered into effect in 1956. Also, the 
government established the Japan Science and Technology Agency (JSTA) and 
the Japan Atomic Power Company in 1957 to introduce nuclear technology from 
the United Kingdom. The consequences were remarkable. The two major electric 
companies—TEPCO and the Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO)—were 
able to secure contracts with General Electric and Westinghouse, respectively, to 
build nuclear reactors. In 1963 and 1964, they adopted the American light-water 
reactor as the model for Japanese reactors. In 1966, the Tokaimura power plant 
started operation with a relatively small-scale 165 megawatts. In 1970, KEPCO 
started operation of the Mihama power plant, and in 1971, TEPCO began to 
operate the Fukushima Daiichi power plant, where the unprecedented nuclear 
disaster occurred in 2011.
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Institutional Take-off, 1973-1985
With China’s nuclear test in 1964, and India’s test in 1974, the United States 
tightened the international non-proliferation regime and became wary of transfer 
of nuclear technology to allies. Exceptionally, however, Japan was allowed to 
expand its international connections regarding nuclear technology (Iida 2011; 
Yoshioka 2011). No doubt the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 contributed to the 
Japanese pursuit of nuclear power. In the 1950s and the 1960s, Japan’s energy 
industry, despite its entering the nuclear age, switched from using coal to oil to 
produce electricity (Tolliday 2012, 6). But the oil crises, which can be regarded 
as external shocks, became significant facilitators, if not driving forces, for the 
development of nuclear power. 
There were active supporters of this development at that stage. First, 
observing the global trend toward nuclear armament, conservative politicians 
came to believe that Japan should develop a full nuclear fuel cycle. They could not 
openly discuss the development of nuclear weapons because Japanese society was 
still very allergic to the idea. However, they considered it necessary to develop all 
potential technology related to weapons development as well as to the production 
of electricity (NHK E-TV 2012; Suzuki 2006). In this sense, the conservative 
politicians were symbionts as well; they disregarded the original spirit of peaceful 
use and instead valued other purposes of the technological development, whereas 
they continuously supported the bottom-line value of energy security and energy 
independence.
Second, technologists at MITI had different reasons to gear up nuclear 
power. With much-trumpeted confidence gained from previous successes, they 
became a driving force behind the nuclear energy project. Supported by U.S.-Japan 
technological cooperation, they managed to turn the nuclear industry into a 
state-sponsored industry where there was no market competition. MITI granted 
each electric company the monopoly of a region and allowed it to set electricity 
price. In this way MITI and the electric companies established a relationship 
based on mutual protection and loyalty (Nanao 2011, 86-92).
Soon after the world oil crisis of October 1973, MITI established a new 
organization to deal with the commercialization and industrialization of nuclear 
power technology: the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE). MITI 
also projected a long-term plan to explore resources, nuclear power being the 
main one. With its leading capacity and a well-functioning ANRE, MITI became 
a powerful and influential organization with regard to nuclear power, although 
the Atomic Energy Commission formally remained the highest decision-making 
body (Yoshioka 2011).
Faced with another oil crisis in 1979, MITI established the New Energy 
Development Organization (NEDO) in October 1980. In 1988, the name 
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was changed to the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development 
Organization. NEDO originally planned to spend its budget not only on nuclear 
power but also on other diversified sources of energy, such as solar panels, wind 
turbines, and thermal energy. To the officials from MITI and NEDO, however, 
nuclear power remained the most promising source. Since they expected 
high initial costs in developing the other energy sources (Nanao 2011, 76-7), 
technologists from MITI and NEDO became strong advocates of nuclear power 
during a period of prevailing uncertainty about alternative sources of energy.
Third, the electric companies, taking advantage of the state-sponsored policy, 
became the strongest promoters of nuclear power. In 1974, the government 
initiated the legalization of three subsidies to the localities hosting nuclear plants: 
the Subsidy for the Promotion of Locating Power Plants, the Special Subsidy for 
the Location, and the Subsidy for Safety Measures of Nuclear Plants. The largest 
portion of the subsidies was poured into the localities selected for locating the 
plants and building reactors and related facilities. The electric companies took 
part in the government’s subsidy scheme. In fact, a significant amount of funding 
for the government subsidies came from the taxes paid by the companies. 
The local governments would then use these subsidies to construct and repair 
infrastructure and welfare facilities such as bridges, water supply facilities, 
swimming pools in elementary schools, libraries, tennis courts, local museums, 
and tourist centers. After the start of the operation, the electric companies 
financially supported hosting cities by paying local taxes, such as property tax and 
the nuclear fuel tax (Nanao 2011, 146-47). These taxes constituted a substantial 
part of the budgets of local governments, ranging from 80% at the lowest to 95% 
at the highest. In this context, the local governments became reliant on the money 
Source: Yoshioka (2011), 144.
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related to nuclear power plants. The money became “sweet candy” (ametama), 
meaning difficult to discontinue, or was likened to an “oxygen mask” without 
which a patient cannot live (Kaneko 2012, 136-43).
To be sure, the electric companies did not make the local cities rich. Usually 
the local cities that accommodated nuclear plants originally suffered from poverty 
and depopulation. Particularly they lacked a young and working population. 
In part, the plants created jobs and slowed depopulation. For instance, in a city 
hosting a nuclear plant in the Fukui Prefecture, one out of four jobs was related to 
the power plant. The nuclear plants, however, drove out other businesses because 
of the latter’s environmental concerns, a situation that eventually impoverished 
these cities (Dauvergne 1993, 587; Dusinberre and Aldrich 2011, 689-90). 
Institutional Peak, 1986-1994
This stage is characterized by continuous growth of nuclear power both in terms 
of remarkable technological advances and the number of power plants. This 
situation in Japan was the opposite of that in the American and European cases. 
The Three Mile Island accident in 1979 led to the suspension of building of 
nuclear reactors in the United States for more than two decades (Furber, Warf, 
and Plotkin 2008). The Reagan administration, inaugurated in 1981, tried to 
reinvigorate the nuclear industry, but the electric companies were reluctant to 
invest in building new plants because of strict safeguards and regulations that 
raised construction costs. The Chernobyl incident of 1986 brought about a 
shock to Europe. As the radioactive material spread to the European continent, 
public confidence in nuclear power seriously eroded. In Japan, public suspicion 
about nuclear energy also deepened. Concerned scholars’ writings contributed 
to this trend. A prime example was that of Hirose Takashi who wrote Kikenna 
hanashi (Dangerous Story) in 1987, in which he revealed the dangerous aspects 
of nuclear power and nuclear waste. It seemed that a fragmented anti-nuclear 
power activism turned into a more integrated opposition. At the end of the 1980s 
and in the beginning of the 1990s, citizen activism, related to the nuclear power 
issue, led to referendums and lawsuits in Hokkaido and Fukui Prefecture to halt 
the construction of a new plant and to reclaim their “rights to safety” (Cyranoski 
2001, 729). One notable impact of the Chernobyl incident on Japan was the rise 
of the cost for locating new plants and the delay of their construction. However, 
the negative impact was not fundamentally detrimental. The government and the 
electric companies undertook unified and concerted actions, particularly through 
expensive public relations campaigns, to gain the confidence of local people 
(Dauvergne 1993, 580-82). 
Japanese nuclear power reached a peak between 1986 and 1994. As shown 
in Figure 1, nuclear power plants continued to be built until the mid-1990s. 
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More important, Japan entered the age of independent nuclear power. Japanese 
technology reached the point of practical use of reprocessing and enrichment in 
the industry. Japan’s independent nuclear power status should be attributed to the 
continuous work of supporters who paved the way for more than three decades: 
conservative politicians such as Nakasone and Shoriki, electric companies, and 
technologists in the government.
In relation to achieving an independent nuclear power industry, one 
remaining technology that Japan desperately sought to acquire was the fast 
breeder reactor (FBR). However, this went against the worldwide trend. The FBR 
was considered an ideal reactor to increase the quantity of plutonium, which 
can be used both as a fuel and as a crucial ingredient of an atomic bomb. At the 
end of the 1970s, most Western nations, including the United States, stopped the 
development of FBRs. Furthermore, the U.S. government stopped reprocessing 
spent fuel because of higher projected cost than disposal. In the early 1990s, 
remaining nations such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany terminated 
their FBR programs (Tolliday 2012, 18). To construct an FBR, a critical problem 
should be solved. The coolant material, sodium, increases the doubling time 
and power, but the enhanced speed and power necessarily bring about safety 
problems. Breeding and safety are contradictory, and thus all the issues related to 
the FBR are practically impossible to solve (Furber, Warf, and Plotkin 2008, 46-8). 
Nevertheless, the United States remained silent on Japan’s plan for constructing 
FBRs and supported Japan’s pursuit of the full nuclear fuel cycle (Lidsky and 
Miller 2002; McCormack 2011). 
In October 1985, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency started the construction 
of the Monju FBR in Tsuruga City in Fukui Prefecture. But the FBR later proved 
not to be a useful prototype in an economic sense, because its construction cost 
was five times that of a conventional reactor (Cyranoski 2010; Koide 2011). The 
Japanese adherence to the FBR was a typical case of competency trap, which was 
irrelevant to efficiency. According to March and Olsen (1989), competency trap 
means the following of old grooves, a situation that slows down the pace of efforts 
to accommodate inputs requiring innovative changes. Japan’s desire to achieve 
technological independence with nuclear power—and the overly ambitious full 
nuclear fuel cycle—virtually disregarded efficiency.
Meanwhile, the Japanese technologists successfully struck an important deal 
with the United States, in November 1987. At talks on revision of the nuclear 
energy cooperation agreement, Japan finally secured U.S. approval for “advance, 
long-term consent for reprocessing, transfers, alteration, and storage of nuclear 
material” (Reagan 1987). This new agreement replaced the 1968 agreement 
according to which Japan was to seek U.S. consent on a case-by-case basis. With 
this new agreement, MITI was able to proceed with the reprocessing program 
and the full nuclear fuel cycle. 
Again, the Japanese companies acted as influential promoters. In order to 
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master the full nuclear fuel cycle, the nine electric companies jointly established 
a proxy company, Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (JNFL), in Rokkasho, Aomori 
Prefecture, in 1985, and in turn the JNFL started construction of a low radioactive 
waste storage facility and an uranium enrichment plant. Both facilities began 
operations in 1992. Also, the JNFL built a huge reprocessing plant in 1993, 
which had greater capacity than that of the Tokai plant. If the plant operates 
fully, it will process 800 tons of nuclear waste to produce one ton of plutonium 
annually (Burnie and Smith 2001, 58; Dauvergne 1993, 586). The JNFL project in 
Rokkasho was one of the largest and most ambitious industrial projects in Japan. 
Rokkasho became the “Atomic Mecca,” as Nakasone recalled (Yamaoka 2011, 
168). 
The manufacturing companies succeeded in developing their own reactor 
model and related facilities and actively sought markets abroad. Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industry was the forerunner in this field. Mitsubishi, which entered 
the nuclear business in 1955, produced its own brand, the pressurized water 
reactor. Although it maintained the license contract with its American partner 
Westinghouse, Mitsubishi inserted more than 90% of its technology into the 
PWR model. Also, Mitsubishi possessed the technology needed for all processes 
required for designing, developing, and building crucial components of the power 
plant, such as turbines and measuring instruments. Mitsubishi exported these 
components to Europe, the United States and China. Surprisingly, the company 
alone took 40% of shares in the nuclear-related market in the United States (Nanao 
2011, 121-24).
Conservative politicians played their role as both promoters and symbionts. 
Witnessing the intensified nuclear arms race between the United States and the 
Soviet Union in the 1980s, the conservative politicians preferred strengthening 
Japan’s nuclear capability. In particular, Prime Minister Nakasone (1982-1987) 
gave priority to acquiring independent nuclear technology as part of Japan’s 
defense policy (Yamaoka 2011, 184-85). He once argued for the need for postwar 
Japan’s remilitarization, and he was a longtime proponent of nuclear technological 
nationalism. In this regard, he might have had in mind the capability for weapons 
development. 
On the other hand, the anti-nuclear activists who advocated the abolition 
of nuclear weapons, for the most part, did not oppose the peaceful use of 
nuclear technology. The only exception was their momentary alignment with 
a small segment of anti-nuclear power activists after the Chernobyl incident. 
Furthermore, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the activists 
hoped that their dream of eliminating all weapons of mass destruction would 
be realized. This was so, in their eyes, because the West also lost the logic of 
possessing, developing, and deploying such weapons in a world where there was 
no enemy.
To sum up, of all the countries that use nuclear power as a source of energy, 
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Japan became the only country to possess a full nuclear fuel cycle: reprocessing, 
enrichment, and the fast breeder reactor. The state-sponsored nuclear industry 
survived the unprecedented nuclear disaster in Chernobyl and its worldwide 
sequels. Also, Japan succeeded in revising the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Energy 
Cooperation Agreement, thus attaining a unique and privileged status in the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
Institutional Stagnation, 1995-2010
In the 1990s, several nuclear plant accidents occurred in Japan one after the other. 
In December 1995, a few months after its first operation, the Monju FBR leaked 
liquid sodium used as a coolant, an accident that eventually caused a fire. The 
more serious problem was that the headquarters tried to conceal the accident and 
delayed reporting it. Monju was expected to start commercial operation before 
2050. In March 1997, there was another accident at the Tokai reprocessing plant. 
A fire occurred at the asphalt solidification factory; the workers at the plant made 
a false report concealing the spread of radioactive materials. In September 1999, 
another fatal accident occurred at Japan Nuclear Fuel Conversion Co. (JCO), 
which had been established in 1979 on the rising trend of nuclear power in Japan. 
Two workers died of exposure to radiation, and 667 people were exposed to 
radiation in varying degrees (McCormack 2011, 269-71). 
Obviously, all these accidents produced a negative public perception about 
the use of nuclear energy. Particularly, the Tokai accident was followed by severe 
criticism of the Power Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Development Corporation 
(PNC). Since its establishment in 1967, the PNC has been the centerpiece of the 
nuclear fuel cycle. It was involved in the development of the FBR and new models 
of nuclear reactors; thus it possessed a lot of high-level radioactive waste, and so 
operated its own reprocessing plant. 
Also, the JCO accident resulted in criticism of the Japan Science and Technology 
Agency (JSTA), which had been the headquarters of the administration and 
management of the JCO and other nuclear research. Eventually the JSTA was 
dissolved and absorbed into the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science 
and Technology, when an organizational restructuring of the government took 
place in 2001. The dissolution of the JSTA meant further empowerment of METI, 
formerly MITI, and strengthened the alignment between METI and the electric 
companies (Yamaoka 2011, 194).
Here it is interesting to observe the internal dynamics of the nuclear power 
institution. First, the conservative politicians continued to play two different 
roles: promoters and symbionts. As promoters who sustained the value of energy 
security, they made efforts to respond to the public disappointment by taking 
initiatives and actions in the Diet to restructure the government’s organization, 
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as described above. It is, however, fair to say that the restructuring could not 
guarantee efficiency with regard to the operation of nuclear power. Rather, the 
restructuring was a mere competency trap. Those politicians’ effort was nothing 
more than a merger of the nuclear power-related organizations. It was not 
intended to alter the excessively ambitious goal: full nuclear fuel cycle.
As symbionts, some top conservative politicians seriously watered down the 
spirit of peaceful use. They took advantage of the achieved technology to openly 
express their ambition for Japan to become a potential nuclear weapons state. 
Witnessing North Korean nuclear tests in October 2006 and May 2009, hawkish 
politicians, such as Nakagawa Shoichi and Aso Taro, broke the longstanding 
taboo in Japan. They argued that the possibility of nuclear armament should be 
discussed in the public sphere (Kim 2013, 92). The nuclear option is not likely to 
achieve public consensus in the short run, because of the multiplicity of actors 
with different interests in regards to the future path for the use of the technology 
(Hymans 2011). But it is no longer taboo to discuss it in political circles and 
with the support of conservative academics (Chanlett-Avery and Nikitin 2009). 
Indeed, the long submerged intention of those conservative politicians finally 
emerged to the surface. 
Second, the technologists and the electric companies remained strong 
promoters, expanding their collusive relationship. With the dissolution of the 
JSTA, METI and its auxiliary organizations retained more power than before. 
Their relationships with electric companies became more collusive than ever. A 
typical collusive practice was amakudari, which literally means descending from 
heaven to earth, but indeed sarcastically implies the ties between supervising 
bureaucrats and businesses. In other words, retired officials took positions with 
the electric companies and play a bridging role between the government and the 
companies. 
There was another reason why technologists promoted nuclear power. 
They used Japan’s nuclear technology as an instrument of a new development 
strategy in times of prolonged economic stagnation. The officials in METI 
actively promoted the need to export their nuclear technology. In June 2010, 
Japan established an agreement for atomic energy cooperation with India. This 
agreement was a kind of follow-up agreement after the U.S.-India nuclear energy 
accord of July 2005, which recognized India as a nuclear weapons state without 
formal recognition of that status (Paul 2007, 846). To be sure, the Japan-India 
agreement breached Japan’s official policy of non-proliferation, because India 
developed atomic bombs and tested them while refusing to enter the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. The technologists’ efforts to export nuclear technology 
became more apparent when Japan signed another nuclear energy cooperation 
agreement with Vietnam, in January 2011, two months before the March 11 
Fukushima incident. This agreement was followed by a 79 billion Japanese yen 
loan to the Vietnamese government. The METI officials’ efforts to export nuclear 
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plants were vigorous. For the project in Vietnam, they competed against the 
Russians; for the United Arab Emirates project, they had to compete with South 
Koreans (DeWit and Iida 2011; Nanao 2011, 41). Obviously they believed that 
exporting nuclear technology would contribute to the state-sponsored industry 
where major stakeholders such as Mitsubishi, Toshiba, and Hitachi were involved.
Meanwhile, some technologists were innovators between the end of the 
1990s and the first half of the 2000s (Yamaoka 2011, 195-96; Yoshioka 2011, 332). 
Their objective was the liberalization of the electric industry whereby nuclear 
power took a significant portion. In 1997, the cabinet decided that any electric 
company could establish sales companies. This decision was intended to make 
the electric market competitive and lower the customers’ bills. In 2001, the METI 
innovators discussed the possibility of division of labor between production 
of electricity and its transmission. But the liberalization effort failed. From the 
beginning, it had limitations because METI did not intend to discard the long-
standing state-sponsored policy toward the electric industry. The biggest obstacle 
was resistance from the existing electric companies, which were enjoying the 
monopoly of production, transmission, and sales in certain areas. The companies 
disputed liberalization, referring to the case of energy shortage in California 
in 2000 and 2001. The California problem occurred because the electricity 
producer, in order to keep the costs down, did not establish new facilities, but the 
high summer temperatures caused a supply shortage. The Japanese companies 
maintained that production, transmission, and sales should not be divided and 
that liberalization would certainly bring about a discrepancy between supply and 
demand. 
Institutional Drift, 2011-present
The damage caused by the March 11 incident in Fukushima was enormous. At 
least 789 people died in relation to the nuclear power disaster, not to mention the 
unknown number of people who were exposed to radiation at the initial stage. 
More than 310,000 people had to leave their homes for the fear of both external 
and internal exposure to radiation (Dauer et al. 2011, 1431; Biello 2011, 811-
13). Statistics show that about 20,000 people left Fukushima Prefecture after 
the incident for various reasons (Kaneko 2012, 141). It is apparent that most of 
them left the prefecture because they were afraid of radiation, while others did so 
because of damage caused by the tsunami. 
Even before the March 11 incident, an earthquake in July 2007 damaged 
TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa nuclear plant and caused the shut-down of four 
reactors. But there was no learning from the 2007 incident. The government and 
TEPCO did not take additional safety measures to cope with earthquakes and 
tsunamis. In this regard, the March 11 incident as a whole was “man-made,” as 
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concluded by the independent report commissioned by the Diet (Nagata 2012).
Since the March 11 incident, nuclear power as an institution has drifted. The 
institutional impetus has conspicuously declined, if not disappeared. The anti-
nuclear power movement has spread throughout Japanese society. Young people, 
housewives, labor union leaders, and middle-class workers have been the main 
participants in the rallies demanding an end to the nuclear power age. They have 
tried to dramatize the March 11 incident in order to sink nuclear power in Japan, 
calling for “exit from nuclear.” Also, the anti-nuclear weapons activists, who had 
been mostly silent for a long period, led the protests against the government’s 
nuclear policy. People have disseminated and obtained information not only 
through traditional media but also through websites that activists, scientists, 
and citizens have operated: for instance, Association for Citizens and Scientists 
Concerned about Internal Radiation Exposure, Citizens’ Nuclear Information 
Center, and Gakujoho (Nuclear Information).
Given this increased level of criticism of nuclear power, defections began 
to appear from among the conservative politicians, the longstanding promoters 
of the nuclear industry, beginning in the summer of 2011 and up until the 
winter of 2012. The first group was composed of a few insurgents who believed 
that Japan should abolish its nuclear power project in the long run. Kan Naoto, 
prime minister at the time of the March 11 incident, represented this group. 
Edano Yukio, chief cabinet secretary, and some DPJ politicians supported Kan. 
The second group consisted of a few other insurgents who took advantage of 
the escalating public criticism of nuclear power to try to expand their political 
popularity and electoral base. Shiga Prefecture Governor Kada Yukio and former 
DPJ leader Ozawa Ichiro belonged to this group. They went along with the anti-
nuclear power activists, upholding the slogan of “exit from nuclear” in the lower 
house elections in December 2012. In terms of integrity and robustness, the first 
and the second groups were never a threat to the institution of nuclear power.
The defections from among the conservative politicians, mentioned above, 
were proven temporary. The longtime promoters and symbionts, represented by 
Abe Shinzo, were successful in justifying the continued need for nuclear power. 
In May 2011, Kan Naoto asked the Chubu Electric Power Company to suspend 
one of the oldest plants, Hamaoka plant, which has been in operation since 1976 
(Kyodo News 2012). Also, Kan declared that Japan would eventually eliminate 
nuclear energy. However, his declaration was short of details and determination. 
Furthermore, he later retracted his demand, saying that it was only his personal 
preference. Apparently Kan’s declaration was his wishful thinking in times of 
heightened anti-nuclear power sentiment. In spite of this weakened position, 
hawkish conservatives such as Abe Shinzo, the then LDP head, criticized Kan’s 
declaration, calling it an irresponsible statement without a solution. In this 
context, Noda, Kan’s successor as prime minister, expressed his desire to maintain 
the present nuclear power industry while decreasing reliance on it, but not 
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eliminating it altogether. The Noda cabinet, in September 2012, retreated from its 
position of calling for the closure of all nuclear plants by the 2030s. This planned 
closure, which would mean gradual elimination during the 2030s, was calculated 
based on the durability of the existing power plants. As shown in Figure 1, the 
latest plants started their operations in the mid-2000s, and thus their 30-year 
lifespan will end in the mid-2030s. A notable point is that the Keidanren, the 
important association of business groups in Japan, suddenly held a joint news 
conference to call for abandonment of the closure plan just one day before the 
Noda cabinet’s retraction (Tabuchi 2012).
Meanwhile, the technologists in the government have proposed no 
alternatives to nuclear power as the main source of energy. Now they believe 
that the export of nuclear power plants can play an important part in the new 
economic development strategy. With the expansion of U.S.-India nuclear 
cooperation, as well as Japan-India cooperation, both the government and the 
manufacturing groups will continue to seek the survival of Japanese nuclear 
technology along that track. As Nohrstedt (2008) aptly notes, the strong actors 
adopt minor changes in the existing policy in response to civil activism’s 
dramatizing efforts. To recapitulate, the critical juncture of the March 11 incident 
has had little impact on the persistence of the existing institution.
Meanwhile, there is a lonely struggle going on in business circles. Son 
Masayoshi, the CEO of Softbank, a telecommunication company, advocates for an 
alternative solution to the shortage of energy resources in Japan. Son established 
the Japan Renewable Energy Foundation after the March 11 incident, and he now 
promotes solar panels and wind power as the most promising renewable sources 
of electricity. He thus hopes to expand his business in this direction. It is worth 
noting that he is arguing that open competition in the electricity market is the 
condition for success in such innovations. He particularly stresses that market 
competition can be guaranteed only by ending the existing monopoly system 
with regard to the production and transmission of electricity (Johnston 2012). 
However, Son is fighting alone as the Keidanren, the most powerful business 
lobby organization, supports the existing electricity market. 
Conclusion
Since the March 11 incident, the public mood in Japan has been bitterly critical of 
the nuclear power industry and of related government policies. Obviously nuclear 
power as an institution will not prosper as it has done in the past. It seems that 
the institution is drifting away from its earlier configuration. However, it is not 
exhausted yet, but persists. Nuclear power will not soon be replaced by anything 
else.
If one sees what has been changed and what has remained intact, one can 
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appraise institutional momentum. On the one hand, the value of the institution—
that is, energy security—mostly remains, although it has not yet been fully 
achieved. On the other hand, the spirit of peaceful use of nuclear power has been 
replaced with the excessively ambitious pursuit of the full nuclear fuel cycle. 
The dominating actors, such as conservative politicians, MITI officials, and the 
electric companies, have successfully achieved the full nuclear fuel cycle. 
Nuclear power in the past six decades has resulted in a competency trap of 
inefficiency. Despite this trap, most actors, except contesting anti-nuclear power 
activists, hold the view that the sunk costs are too high to consider replacing 
nuclear power. The dominating actors do not debate a possible alternative. 
Increasing public criticism is not sufficient—and perhaps it is impossible—to 
reverse the existing nuclear fuel cycle, which is now the core of today’s nuclear 
power industry. The dominant actors take part in the institution of nuclear power 
as veto players to any displacement. 
Note
This work was supported by National Research Foundation of Korea-Grant funded by the 
Korean Government (NRF-2010-361-A00017).
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